

A GEO-HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE GILGIT FRONTIER IN THE 19TH CENTURY

Ashutosh Singh *

What is a Frontier?

Natural geography and the environment have defined and shaped the advancement and evolution of human cultures and civilizations in human history. It is possible for geographical obstacles to result in the isolation of a human civilization from the effects of neighbouring cultures or to safeguard a culture from the invasion of hostile invaders. It is impossible to provide a compelling solution to the question of why the Mycenaean's had a cultural heritage based on seafaring, or why the Mongols had a cultural tradition based on nomadic equestrianism, without first gaining an appreciation of the role that geography played in their respective cultural evolutions. To speak more particularly to the matter at issue, geographical features have been used throughout recorded history as markers of boundaries within which communities that shared a common language and culture have resided. This has been the case throughout the entirety of the human experience. In ancient Greece, the Pindus Mountains served as a boundary between Greater Epirus or Thessalonica and Macedonia. Subsequently, the Rhine River became a boundary between the Roman Empire and the Germanic areas to the east of the empire. This system of territorial delimitation is also referred to by the expression "a limes on the Rhine." These geographical characteristics have, through the course of time and the development of a sense of national identity, come to serve as the delineators of the borders of states that have been founded along national lines and are known as nation states. These nation states eventually took the place of the kingdoms and empires that existed in the past. The Alps, the Pyrenees, and the Rhine continue to serve as the primary geographic features that define the borders of Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, and Bulgaria, respectively. The Rhine also serves as a boundary between France and Spain. In more recent times, the Rio Grande River came to serve as the boundary between the United States of America and Mexico in the 19th century.

The question of whether or not natural geographic characteristics should be used to define the political boundaries of states is one that has generated much debate. In his book titled 'The New Europe: Some Essays in Reconstruction,' Arnold Toynbee makes the

* Amity School of Liberal Arts, Amity University Rajasthan, Jaipur

observation that 'Natural Frontiers are, in fact, the most artificial that can be drawn, and are simply a euphemism for the momentary conquests of brute force.'¹ While it may be true that politicians may whimsically interpret where such natural frontiers of a nation may lie, it is equally an undeniable reality that natural frontiers exist. The geographical landmass known as the "Indian Subcontinent," which is located in Asia but is separated from the rest of the continent's landmass by a number of natural barriers, is the subject of the term "Indian Subcontinent," which refers to the landmass itself. Later on, Professor Dudley Stamp would go on to make the following observation: "Perhaps there is no other part of a landmass anywhere else in the world that was so well demarcated by physical features than the Indian Subcontinent." The enormous Himalayan Mountain range, which stretches from the Brahmaputra River in the East to the Indus River in the West and Pamir, as well as the Hindukush and Karakoram Mountain ranges to the West and North are included among these natural frontiers of the subcontinent. Great deserts and extensive forests, respectively, established natural fortifications on its western and eastern sides. Despite their intimidating and formidable appearance, these natural barriers are not in any way impenetrable. In some areas, narrow passages have made it possible for explorers, soldiers, and merchants of all stripes to travel through their valleys and into the Indian subcontinent over the course of several millennia. However, despite these limited exchanges of people, the physical separation that was so successfully maintained was sufficient for the subcontinent to create a cultural identity that is unique from that of the rest of Asia, despite the many instances of cultural parallels and exchanges that occurred over the course of time. The mountain ranges located in the northern part of South Asia were, without a question, the most formidable of these obstacles. The Pamir Knot is a junction of three mountain ranges: the Himalayas, the Hindukush, and the Karakoram. These three mountain ranges are home to some of the highest mountain ranges in the world. This particular location, which can be thought of as the natural barrier given by the northern mountains, is the focus of this particular study.

*"The term 'frontier' in political geography has two different meanings: it can refer to either the political division between two states or the division between the settled and uninhabited parts of one state. In either case the frontier may be considered as a line or a zone. While the context normally prevents confusion between the two meanings, problems of interpreting the sense can easily arise. It is for this reason that some geographers have attempted to restrict the use of the term to features possessing width, referring to simple linear divides as boundaries."*²

In the study of political geography, the term "frontier" itself carries with it a number of distinct connotations. In his book "The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries," J.R.V. Prescott describes it as either the political split between two states or the division between the settled and unsettled areas of a state. Both of these interpretations are accurate.

A topographical sketch of the region:

As a result, the region has historically been classified according to criteria that are somewhere in between the two classifications. It had a very low population density, although it was never completely devoid of inhabitants; however, it served as a bulwark for the more thickly populated regions as the terrain gradually sank towards the valleys of Kashmir to the southeast and Swat to the southwest. Throughout addition, throughout the eras that came before the modern nation states' well defined political boundaries, it served as the border between the states of whichever state was powerful enough to maintain control over it. Ladakh, which is located to the region's east, and Afghanistan, which is located to the region's west are both physically connected to the Gilgit-Baltistan region. A narrower pass that extends to the South connects the corridor to Gilgit-Baltistan. The Wakhan Corridor can be found to the north-west of Gilgit and goes from west to east, providing a connection from Afghanistan to the Chinese region of Xinjiang.

Throughout the course of history, this region has served as the crossroads where three distinct cultures converge: Central Asian, Chinese, and Indian. The Khyber Pass, which can be found to the Southwest of Chitral and is located at the westernmost portion of this natural barrier of the Indian subcontinent, has historically been the most common entry point for invaders into India. In the distant past, the Persians, Greeks, Parthians, and Kushans used this passage to invade the Indian Subcontinent. In more recent times, however, the Turks, Timurids, Mughals, and Afghans made use of this gateway to enter the subcontinent. In order to protect themselves from potential dangers emerging from Central Asia, all of the major political forces of the time, notably the Mughals and the Delhi Sultanates, placed a high priority on protecting the Khyber Pass. In point of fact, a compelling case can be made in this regard that the political destiny of the Indian states is going to be determined by the degree to which they are able to exercise control over this western entryway into the country. The victory that Nadir Shah had at the Battle of the Khyber Pass in 1738 was the event that set the stage for the sacking of Delhi in 1739. This would shortly be followed by an assault into India by Ahmad Shah Abdali, who would go on to win the Third Battle of Panipat in 1761. Both the Mughals and, later, the Marathas were unable to maintain control of the Khyber Pass during their respective periods of rule. After the Sikh Empire was defeated by the British in the Second Anglo-Sikh War, the British would arrive

and attempt to gain control of these natural frontiers of the subcontinent. This would happen after the British defeated the Sikh Empire.



Image 1 - A Relief map of Gilgit-Baltistan³

Since the British were such good students of history, they realised the necessity of preserving these natural entryways into India and took appropriate measures to do so. By the 19th century, however, the geostrategic threat posed by Central Asia was significantly different from what it was in the previous century. The threat was no longer posed by a force based in Central Asia; rather, it was posed by a state based in Europe that was spreading across Europe and into Central Asia; specifically, Russia. The primary reason the British were interested in preserving Afghanistan was so that it might serve as a buffer zone between their British Indian Empire in India and the Russian Empire to the north. This international conflict, also referred to as the "great game," was the deciding element that led to the British political strategies that ultimately resulted in this region acquiring its current political form.

An ethnographical sketch of the region:

"Tribes of the Hindukush" by Col. John Biddulph is considered to be one of the most significant eyewitness reports from the 19th century that were written by British explorers who travelled to the Northern region of Gilgit-Baltistan. This book discusses the ethnic and

linguistic composition of the regional inhabitants of Gilgit-Baltistan. Between the years 1873 and 1878, Biddulph made trips to this part of the country. The commencement of the second Anglo-Afghan war in 1878 was the only thing that prevented him from completing his survey of the province in its entirety. The peculiarities of the region's geography, as described by Biddulph, had an influence on the habits of the people who lived there, as the author explains. He notes that the topography of the region of Gilgit and Baltistan featured valleys that were extraordinarily low and deep, as well as quite narrow, particularly at the points where they entered the mountains.

This results in these routes being difficult to reach and easily closed off during the extended winter months, leading to a sense of isolation and different identity from the neighbouring regions that are nearby of comparison to the considerably larger territory of Ladakh, the population density of Gilgit, in particular, and the neighbouring region of Baltistan, to a lesser extent, is significantly higher than that of Ladakh. Biddulph points out that the valleys in the Gilgit region spread as they widen at higher altitudes, and that despite the territory's close proximity to Punjab, it has historically been isolated. This is due to the fact that the valleys in the Gilgit region widen as they widen at higher altitudes. He makes the observation that the area of Gilgit as well as the land to the west of it is populated by lawless and violent tribes that have always engaged in blood feuds and practised anarchy as a way of life. The British explorer William Moorcroft, who was unable to visit Gilgit-Baltistan but did discourse about the "Dardic people," is credited with being the first person to bring the word "Dard" into the public consciousness in the 19th century. Dr. William Leitner was the one who travelled to the area and lived among the locals, whom he believed to be members of a "Aryan" race of people who had survived unaltered without mixing with non-Aryan populations in their inaccessible and remote mountainous abodes for hundreds or possibly thousands of years. Leitner's observations led him to conclude that the locals had maintained their "Aryan" identity for the entirety of their existence. According to Leitner, these people spoke a family of languages known as the 'Dardic' languages, which he claimed to be proto-Indo-Aryan languages. Leitner also referred to these people as the 'Dards'. Heavily influenced by Alexander Cunningham's then-contemporary beliefs of the Aryans as a civilising force, arriving to India from their Eurasian Urheimat, a tiny group of them would go on to attract many an ethnologist to the region, as they survived high in the remote and inhospitable frontier of India.⁴

Later research disproved the theory that all of these individuals in the regions comprised a single ethno-linguistic group, demonstrating that this was an incorrect assumption. In point of fact, the entirety of the region that is referred to as Dardistan was made up of a

number of distinct ethnic groups. These communities, despite having varying degrees of interaction with one another, generally chose not to intermarry in order to preserve their individual identities. A significant portion of the western lands that make up the region known as Dardistan are located in what is now Afghanistan. As one leaves the Kashmir valley and travels further north, one would reach Dardistan, which is comprised of the areas of Darel and Chilas, Gilgit, then Nagar and Hunza farther up north in that sequence. Yasin was the region that was located to the west of Gilgit, while Chitral was the next region to the west. Before the Indus River reaches the Swat valley farther to the south, it passes through the Hazara-populated district of Kohistan, which is located to the southwest of Yasin. The Indus River falls into the valley at this point. According to Leitner, the region of Chitral, which shares a border with Afghanistan to the West, as well as Kohistan, which is located to the Southeast, are both included in the Dardic lands. To the West of Chitral in Afghanistan is a territory that has historically been referred to as Kafiristan, which literally means "the land of non-believers." This is evidence that the community followed pre-Islamic practises that had a strong connection to Hinduism. Dardistan encompassed the wide region that stretches from the eastern part of Afghanistan to Gilgit in the east, Yasin in the north, and Kohistan in the southernmost part of the province. Being a great cultural meeting point and being in a remote location meant that it was highly improbable that this huge region would be populated by people from the same cultural group. Instead, it was more likely that this enormous region would be populated by small groups of people who were the result of contact between various cultural units.




Image 2 - The Dard regions and the Pamir Knot⁵

The Gilgit region is of utmost importance from a military and political standpoint to the larger Gilgit-Baltistan region.⁶ In his memoirs, Biddulph makes the observation that roads leading from all of the neighbouring valleys converge onto Gilgit. Because of this, Gilgit has historically been the centre of any local confederacy, and it makes perfect sense that it would also be a vital site for any big force that is not local to the region. Gilgit, which is not difficult to reach at all, has occasionally served as an extension that protrudes into Kashmir from the northwest. This occurs when Kashmir is surrounded by mountains. Therefore, it is only logical that the kings of Yasin and Chitral would try to exercise their dominance over Gilgit at various times during the 19th century. The inhabitants of Hunza are described as being "warlike," but the people of Nagar are said to be "timid,"⁷ with the inference being that this may have something to do with the fact that they adhere to the Shiite branch of Islam, since there has been a long tradition of competition between the two groups of people. It was a widely held belief in the 19th century that Sunnis were more warlike than Shia, who were thought to lack the necessary martial aptitude, and these opinions are symptomatic of that prevalent belief. Biddulph continues by saying that there is a widespread belief that people from Hunza have always had the reputation of being thieves.⁸ He goes on to say that this is a popular misconception. This traditional concept of the Hunza being warlike is linked to their raids on the neighbouring regions while being secure in their inaccessible mountain fortresses. These raids were carried out when the Hunza were in a position of relative safety. This entire region has a long history of tribal wars over grazing pastures and animals, both of which are highly treasured. These confrontations have been going on for a long time. The Hunza do, in fact, engage in a significant amount of agriculture within their area, which is located to the north of the Wakhan corridor.⁹

Locally, the language that is spoken by the people of Hunza, particularly in the upper portions of the region, is known as the Burushaski or 'Boorishki' as noted by Leitner.¹⁰

*"Having been on a special mission by the Panjab Government, in 1866, when I discovered the races and languages of "Dardistan," and gave the country that name, and again having been on special duty with the Foreign Department of the Government of India in 1886 in connection with the Boorishki language and race of Hunza, Nagyr, and a part of Yasin, regarding which I have recently completed Part I. of a large work, I may claim to speak with some authority as regards these districts, even if I had no other claim."*¹¹

Leitner explains that even though the inhabitants speak Boorishki, all of the songs are in the 'Shina' language. The Dardic language known as Shina does not have its own

script, but it is now written using the Arabic script. Shina belongs to the Dardic family of languages. According to Biddulph's explanation, even the residents of the region that do not know the Shina language sing in Shina even though they do not understand the language. The region of Gilgit, along with the westernmost regions of Ladakh, is home to the majority of the world's most eminent speakers of the Shina language. This gives the region a more important role for the Shina language.

Even as late as the 1880s, the risk of regular tribal raids was serious enough in the territories of Hunza and its bordering regions that inhabitants would retreat each night into miniature fortresses, with at least one of these fortifications being present in each hamlet. This was the case in the areas. In his descriptions, Biddulph describes such forts as having walls that are 15 feet tall and being constructed out of bricks that have been sun-dried. He makes the observation that although such forts existed in Gilgit as well, under Dogra authority they had fallen into disuse and were no longer maintained. As a direct result of Dogra authority, there has been a significant decrease in intertribal fighting, which is indicative of relative peace and security. Biddulph is interested in the religious practises of the Hunza tribes because, in comparison to the religious practises of the tribes in the surrounding area, the Hunza tribes appear to adhere to a substantially less strict interpretation of Islam. It has been asserted that the people of Hunza have a greater propensity for imbibing wine and eating foods that deviate from the norm:

*"Mahommedanism sits but loosely on the Hunza people, who make no secret of their preference for easy-going tenets. Though professing to be Maulais, they are disowned by their own Pirs, who refuse to visit the country, and no contributions are sent by them to their spiritual chief. They are great wine drinkers, and are reproached by their neighbours for their readiness to eat unorthodox food, and for the immorality of their women."*¹²

It is therefore evident that the people who lived in this isolated location, which was home to a large number of different tribes and peoples, each of which had their own unique language and culture, and who occasionally interacted with one other but did not assimilate with each other resembled a kind of melting pot of numerous communities. Due to the region's relative isolation, it would only ever be exposed to a trickle of new languages and religions, despite its location near historic trade routes; nonetheless, this situation would never escalate into a flood. At the very least since the time of the Mauryan Empire, the region has been ruled by a succession of great empires at various times. The Mongols, the Mughals, and even the Chinese, to whom the Hunza briefly pledged allegiance as suzerains, did leave behind their genetic footprints among the population. Nevertheless, the fundamental

cultural aspects that are still present remind us of the Indic cultural foundations of the Hunza. Biddulph notes in his description that the word "Soori," which is very near to the word "Shri," is one of the names of Goddess Laxmi, was addressed to in reverence as "Soori." The rulers of Hunza and Nagar, the districts to the North of Hunza which are known as Thum, were known as "Thum."

Both Thums are still addressed as Soori, as a title of respect. This appears to be the same as Sri, an appellation of Lakshmi, the Hindoo goddess of wealth, commonly prefixed to the names of Hindoo princes in India to denote their honour and prosperity. The Thum's wives are styled "ganish", which is almost identical with the original Sanskrit word for mother, and their sons are called "gushpoor".¹³

Chilas, which is located to the south of Gilgit, includes cultural elements that are comparable to those of the Pashtun people. The Jushteros are the Chilasi equivalent of the Pashtun Jirga's council of elders, and the Sigas are the Chilasi equivalent of the Pashtun Jirga's Sigas. The Sigas make decisions on matters ranging from war to matters pertaining to their respective communities, including those topics. On the other hand, this is where the similarities come to a stop. The Pashtun Jirga is the body that has jurisdiction over criminal cases; the Sigas do not make those decisions. In accordance with the sharia, criminal cases, most significantly murder, were decided by the ulema. Blood feuds are not permitted to endure for an indefinite period of time, as Biddulph also points out, in contrast to the Pashtun culture.¹⁴

The Sikh Empire and the Gilgit region:

The year 1839, which was the year when Maharaja Ranjit Singh passed away and marked the beginning of the end for the Sikh Empire, is the starting point for the research that will be conducted for this project. A number of political manoeuvrings would take place in the Lahore court, which was the centre of Sikh authority, and eventually Maharaja Gulab Singh would become the de-facto ruler of Jammu. After the demise of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, Dr. A.H. Dani has some complimentary things to say about Gulab Singh's performance in the role of a leader. After Jammu was conquered by the Sikh Empire in 1808, Gulab Singh decided to become a member of the Sikh Army the following year. The territory of Jammu, which had previously been under Dogra administration, was annexed by the Sikh Empire at this time and served as a port of entry for that power structure into Kashmir. Kishore Singh, Gulab Singh's father, was honoured for the significant contributions made by his family, particularly Gulab Singh, to the Sikh Empire by being given the position of Hakim, also known as Governor of Jammu, in 1820. This honour was bestowed upon

Kishore Singh by the Sikh Empire. Gulab Singh succeeded Kishore Singh as the Governor of Jammu for the Sikh Empire after Kishore Singh passed away in 1822.

The early beginnings of the present state of Jammu and Kashmir may be traced back to Gulab Singh's ascension to the throne of Jammu. Gulab Singh was essential in expanding the limits of the Sikh Empire towards the west from the Kashmir valley, beyond Rajouri, and towards Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where the Sikh general fought Afghans at Shaidu in 1827. This expansion took place from Kashmir valley all the way to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This fight was the climax of the conflict between the Sikh Empire and the Afghan Durrani Empire, and it solidified Sikh rule over the region.

Dr. A.H. Dani makes the observation that the Sikh Empire considered itself to be the heir of the Mughal Empire in the Punjab and the western provinces when it was ruled by Maharaja Ranjit Singh.¹⁵ As a result of this, it was reasonable to anticipate that it would make an effort to impose its authority over the northern and western entry points into the subcontinent. The Sikhs, as an organised group, would later demand tribute from both Ladakh and Baltistan, which, at the time, were both ruled by local kings who were opposed to any Sikh expansion. Zorawar Singh, a Sikh general, initiated a series of military actions in Ladakh beginning in the year 1834.¹⁶ Alexander Cunningham, a British historian, notes that despite the fact that the Dogra were Sikh feudatories, there were fundamental contrasts between the goals of the Sikhs and those of the Dogra. Because Dogra control over Ladakh would open up alternate trade channels to India through Jammu, bypassing Kashmir, which would have been detrimental to the interests of the Lahore court, the Sikh governor of Kashmir, Mihan Singh, was attempting to incite a rebellion among the people of Ladakh against their Dogra rulers. He did this because Dogra control over Ladakh would allow alternate trade routes to India through Jammu. During this time, Ladakh and Baltistan were eager for British support against the threat posed by the Sikhs. After Ranjit Singh's death, the Lahore court would be besieged by a succession of intrigues and political instability, which would be a manifestation of the underlying conflicts that existed within the Sikh nobility. Following Ranjit Singh's passing, Gulab Singh's relationship with the Lahore Court would deteriorate, and both his younger brother and nephew would be brutally put to death. In the year 1844, Lahore issued an order that led to the invasion of Jammu in an effort to coerce Gulab Singh into paying tribute. As a reward for Gulab Singh's good behaviour following the Sikh Empire's defeat in the first Anglo-Sikh War in 1846, the right to continue controlling his area of Jammu and Kashmir was sold to him for the price of 750,000 Nanakshahi Rupees.¹⁷ This occurred after the Sikh Empire was defeated in the war.

Following its incorporation into the Mughal Empire in 1634, the province of Gilgit,

which had historically maintained subsidiary links with the political power centre in India, became a member of that empire.¹⁸ This control was maintained through a web of marital bonds and links of kinship with other members of the family. At the beginning of the 19th century, the territory of Gilgit was governed by the ancient local Trakhan Dynasty. However, by the year 1839, the region had been through several years of conflict and had considerably lost its strength. This frontier territory was set to be subjugated by a new political force in the neighbourhood, specifically the new princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, with approbation from the British paramount power. Mughal authority had long since waned, and the new political power in the vicinity was the new princely state of Jammu and Kashmir.

The kingdom of Hunza was located to the North-northwest of Gilgit, and the kingdom of Chitral was located to the west of Hunza. Chitral had a border with Afghanistan on its western side. By the late 18th century, these lands, which had formerly been part of the Mughal empire's frontiers, had selected new rulers. By the year 1760, Hunza had sworn allegiance to the Qing court in China, which served as its suzerain. These tiny kingdoms, which were ruled by smaller regional dynasties, either became independent or pledged their devotion to forces that were external to the subcontinent as a result of the decline of Mughal dominance, the advent of Europeans in India, and the subsequent political upheaval that followed. Yasin, which is located on the most Western tip of the Gilgit region had already established itself as a regional authority by the beginning of the 19th century and would later attempt to extend its influence and control throughout Gilgit. The monarch of Yasin was opposed to the growth of Sikh authority, which was pressing northwards towards the erstwhile ruins of the Durrani Empire and even much beyond that. In accordance with what A.H. In the year 1842, Dani, the Sikh Governor in Kashmir received authorization from the Lahore Darbar to send around one thousand troops on an expedition led by Nathu Shah. The administration of Gilgit would continue to be handled by this force, with Karim Khan's assistance.¹⁹ Karim Khan was the son of Tahir Shah, the ruler of Nagar. Tahir Shah appeared to be hostile to any efforts made by Yasin to acquire control of Gilgit and as a result, effectively acknowledged Sikh suzerainty over the region. Karim Khan was named after Tahir Shah. By the middle of the 1840s, the Sikh power was well established in the region, with Kashmir serving as its base of operations. This was the case despite the opposition of Gohar Aman, the ruler of Yasin.

The integration of Baltistan, which is the province that is located to the east of Gilgit and borders on Ladakh, needs to be understood in the context of the campaigns that were conducted by the Dogra commander Zorawar Singh into Ladakh. In spite of the fact that

Zorawar Singh was put to death in the year 1841, by the year 1845 Baltistan was firmly established as a component of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir.²⁰ A.H. Dani makes the observation that the Dogras will be successful in exacting a tribute from the local rulers of Baltistan, in contrast to the Sikhs, who were unsuccessful in doing so.²¹

It is essential to take into account the fact that A.H. Dani, while exceedingly detailed and articulate in his presentation of the facts, takes great pains to do so, such that it appears as though the region known as Gilgit-Baltistan has always resisted foreign domination if it was of a non-Muslim character. This is because Dani presents the facts in such a way that it looked as if they did. When carried out against an outsider, the petty politics of local rulers in the region are presented as "Jihad,"²² and their differentiation from the rest of Kashmir is emphasised. In spite of this, he acknowledges that it was the first time after the Mughals that anyone, in this case the Dogras, would be successful in extracting tribute from this so-called "frontier region."²³

In spite of the fact that the Dogras under Gulab Singh were successful in expanding their grip over this territory, the early years, up until the year 1846, were characterised by a number of local revolts and uprisings. After the Dogras took control of Gilgit, the former monarch of Skardu, Raja Ahmad Shah, was taken prisoner and put on trial for his crimes. After the death of Zorawar Singh in 1841, he was freed from captivity, and he took advantage of this opportunity to scheme his return to power in concert with the other nobles of Gilgit and Baltistan. Zorawar Singh's death provided him with the opportunity to do so. Local rulers like as Ali Khan of Skardu, Daulat Ali Khan of Khaplu, and Khurram Khan of Kiris were among these nobles from Baltistan. Other nobles from Baltistan included Khurram Khan of Kiris. This group of disgruntled lords would raise the flag of revolt, put Bhagwan Singh, the highest ranking Dogra official in Skardu, in jail, and then proceed to rob the money and the armaments held in the Skardu fort. Many members of the nobility who did not side with the insurgents would also be put behind bars, like Suleiman Khan of Shigar and Muhammad Shah of Skardu, for example. Gulab Singh responded to this danger by dispatching from Kishtwar a force consisting of 3,000 soldiers led by Wazir Lakhpat. This force travelled through Suru on its way to Kargil. At Kargil, he would have company in the form of Ali Sher Khan, a resident of either Kartaksho or Kharmang in Baltistan. Ali Sher Khan, who was on Gulab Singh's side, would counsel Wazir Lakhpat, who was on Wazir's side, to first march towards Baltistan. When Wazir Lakhpat arrived in the region, his first order of business was to begin laying siege to the fort of Kharpocha, which was the safe haven for Haider Khan, the leader of the revolt. The Dogras were victorious in their assault on the Kharpocha fort, which resulted in it being destroyed by fire. The leader of this

uprising, Haider Khan, would eventually be able to flee, but he would later be apprehended by one of his own collaborators, Daulat Ali Khan. Daulat Ali Khan would then hand Haider Khan over to Lakhpat, who would then transport him to Jammu. After that, Wazir Lakhpat would go on to repress the countryside and anyone who was suspected of having ties to the insurgents. After the repairs are finished, Bhagwan Singh will return to his role as commander of the Kharpocha fort, which he held before the revolt. The year 1846 marked the end of a string of significant uprisings against the Dogras that had been taking place in the region up until that point. This would be in Zanskar, which is in Ladakh, and it was a commander of Gulab Singh's named Basti Ram who put down the rebellion there.

The year 1846 was a turning point in the course of the history of the area. As a result of the British victory in the First Anglo-Sikh War, the Sikhs were forced to sign the Treaty of Lahore on March 9, 1846. This effectively ended Sikh resistance to British rule. Under the terms of the Treaty of Amritsar, Gulab Singh was elevated to the position of king of Gilgit one week later, on March 16, 1846. In his memoirs, Fredrick Drew, a British officer who served at the court of Gulab Singh, writes about a region of India called "The northern barrier of India." In one version of the history of Jammu and Kashmir, Kashmir and Gilgit are said to have been given to Gulab Singh as part of the Treaty of Amritsar. As a consequence of this event, the ruler of Hunza is said to have violated his pact with the Dogras.

*"On Kashmir, and with it Gilgit, being ceded to Gulab Singh, Nathu Shah left the Sikhs and transferred his services to the new ruler, and went to take possession of Gilgit for him. In this there was no difficulty. The Dogra troops relieved the Sikh posts at Astor and Gilgit. Most of the Sikh soldiers took service under the new rulers; they were few in number, those at Gilgit being perhaps not more than one hundred. The state of peace did not long continue. It was broken by the Hunza Raja making an attack on the Gilgit territory and plundering five villages. Nathu Shah led a force up the valley of the Hunza River to avenge this attack; but his force was destroyed, and he himself was killed, as also was Karim Khan, the titular Raja of Gilgit, who had accompanied him."*²⁴

He continues by saying that Nathu Shah, a former Sikh commander, transferred his devotion to the Dogras just when the fortunes of his former sovereign, the Sikh empire, had changed for the worse.

Under Gulab Singh's rule from 1848 to 1857

This narrative that has been offered by Fredrick Drew is being contested in a direct

and forceful manner by A.H. Dani. Dani contends that Fredrick misrepresents the facts and insinuates that his position as an English emissary to the Dogra court gave him a bias to describe things in favour of the Dogras.²⁵ Dani's argument is that Fredrick misrepresents the facts and that he insinuates that his position gave him a prejudice. In keeping with his historical narrative of a "jihad" against Dogra and Sikh rule, he cites an account written by Dr. Gottlieb William Leitner, a British orientalist and a member of the Indian Civil Services. In this account, Dr. Gottlieb William Leitner describes a rebellion that was led by Gohar Aman, the ruler of Yasin, and supported by the rulers of Hunza and Nagar as well as the "people of Gilgit."

Gohar Aman accordingly sends troops under his brother Akbar Aman and captures the Bargu and Shukayot Forts in Gilgit territory. The Rajas of Hunza and Nagyr combine with Gohar Aman and assisted by the Gilgit people, with whom Karim Khan was unpopular because of his friendship for Kashmir, defeat and kill Nathe Shah and Karim Khan. Gohar Aman captures the Gilgit and Chaprot Forts." - Dr Leitner in his note of 1848. 26

Due to the fact that he was aligned with the Dogras, Karim Khan was inevitably portrayed in an unfavourable light, and this led to Karim Khan's unpopularity. Obviously, this does not disclose the fact that Dr. Leitner was an ardent traveller and had taken the name AbdurRasheedSayyah while he was visiting Turkey and the frontier regions of India. In addition, Dr. Leitner was a well-known advocate for Islam and Jihad in Victorian England throughout the 19th century, and his works were essential in formalising the modern western perspective of Jihad.

Germain claims that the notion of jihad was key in forming the image of Islam in the West in the last decades of the nineteenth century and that Leitner played an important role as an apologist for Islam and the 'true meaning' of jihad.²⁷

As a result, it seems as though certain facts were chosen because they fit a particular narrative, rather than because they were presented in an objective manner. As the uprising gained momentum, the ruler of Punial and Yasin, Gauhar Rahman, decided to join the conflict against the Dogras as well. Gulab Singh's answer was to send two groups of men against the rebels, one from Baltistan and the other from Hasora. Despite encountering some resistance along the way, Gulab Singh was ultimately successful in bringing peace to the region. Until 1852, there was a discernible lull in both violent outbursts and insurrections that lasted the subsequent few years. A rebellion would take place in the year 1852, which would effectively lead to the loss of Gilgit and Dardic regions to the south of Gilgit, also known as Dardistan, for the duration of Gulab Singh's rule.



Image 3 - Administrative divisions of Gilgit Baltistan²⁸

It was in the year 1852 when Gauhar Rahman made the decision to redouble his attempts to topple the Dogra government that controlled the region. Fredrick Drew says that he does not fully understand the reasoning behind Gauhar Rahman's decision to do it at this time.²⁹ It would appear that there were two significant Dogra strongholds in the region of Gilgit in the year 1852; one of these was at Naupura, which was located close, and the other was under the authority of Sant Singh, who was the commander of the Gilgit fort. The following information regarding the Dogra fiasco has been brought to our attention by Fredrick Drew, who has provided us with an overview of the events. The fort at Naupura was only a few miles distant from the fort that was placed in Gilgit. The Naupura fort was commanded by Ram Din, who was in charge of a Gurkha regiment; the majority of Dogra reserve soldiers were stationed at Bawanji in Astor. The distance between Gilgit and Astor is about equivalent to around 100 kilometres. The rapid mobilisation of Gauhar Rahman's army would result in the two forts being encircled and their lines of communication being severed. As soon as Bhup Singh learned of these occurrences, he would rush to their rescue. However, he would meet them at a location that Drew calls "Nila Dhar," which was located on the banks of the Gilgit river.³⁰ Bhup Singh was in a position that was extremely precarious from a strategic point of view since he was encircled on all sides by elevations, and he was effectively cornered. The path that lay in front of him had been blocked off, and the Dards had circled around behind him, preventing him from taking any kind of covert flight. On the opposite bank of the river, the Hunza soldiers had amassed in order to foil any possible escape attempts. The Dogra people, who were already struggling with a lack of food supplies, were given false hope by the Dards, who had no intention of actually fulfilling

their pledge. After seven days of going without food, the situation had deteriorated to the point where it was highly critical, and the rebels attacked from all sides, annihilating the forces that were led by Bhup Singh.³¹ Drew, you can't help but notice the striking similarities between the strategies that are being utilised here and those that were utilised by the Afghans under Akbar Khan during the first Anglo-Afghan War. During that conflict, the Afghans ambushed and annihilated the British Indian army that was led by Major General Elphinstone.

*"The Dards then began to play the game of double dealing, in which they are adepts. They promised Bhup Singh provisions, for of these he was quite short, and a safe passage back if he would agree to retire. This he consented to do, and he waited for days in hopes of the food coming. The Dards kept him in expectation, and fed his hopes; one might almost fancy that they had learnt a lesson from Akbar Khan of Kabul."*³²

Drew goes on to say that approximately a thousand men lost their lives at this location, and that at the same time that this tragedy was occurring with Gulab Singh's reserve troops, a similar destiny was befalling his garrisons in Gilgit and Naupura.³³ Any attempts by soldiers to leave the forts were ambushed and put down with deadly force. It is possible to say, without going into any further detail, that Dogra power ceased to exist on the northern or 'right' bank of the Indus River in Dardistan, and that Gauhar Rahman established himself in Gilgit. Gulab Singh would not make an effort to expand his sphere of influence in Baltistan beyond Bawanji (which is now known as Bunji), which would be the point at which his authority over the region would be considered to have reached its maximum. This was the case even if Baltistan was still under his control.

Consolidation of Gilgit under Ranvir Singh

After his father, Gulab Singh, passed away in 1857, Ranvir Singh succeeded to the throne and became king. In his capacity as an English geologist, Fredrick Drew would make his way to the Kashmir court during the time that Ranvir Singh was in power there. Ranvir Singh was resolved to extend his control to the areas of Gilgit and beyond, despite the fact that his father had previously met with a significant amount of failure in these endeavours. During the Great Indian Uprising of 1857, Ranvir Singh had supplied the British with men, which helped them put down the revolt. In August of 1857, after some early reluctance, Ranvir Singh would ultimately commit men to the cause.³⁴ It would not be until the year 1860 before efforts and attention was turned again towards the Gilgit region.

In that same year, a renowned Dogra leader by the name of Devi Singh was in charge of a troop that was dispatched over the Indus. When Gauhar Rahman passed died right

before Devi Singh's army arrived in Gilgit, it left the local resistance without a commander.³⁵ This would eventually result in the destruction of the resistance in Gilgit and the taking of Gilgit fort, a powerful redoubt that the Dogras had already lost control of in 1872, five years earlier. This army would continue their advance further to the northwest of Gilgit in the direction of Yasin, which is located in the and borders Chitral further to the west. As soon as they arrived at Yasin, Devi Singh installed Azmat Shah, a first cousin of Gauhar Rahman of Gilgit and the son of Sulaiman Shah, on the throne. Sulaiman Shah, the former ruler of Yasin who was responsible for seizing Gilgit from Mohammad Khan in the year 1800, enjoyed a great deal of prestige among the people who lived in Yasin at the time. However, as soon as the Dogra forces, who had never planned to physically take Yasin in the first place, turned around and left, Azmat Shah would be overthrown by the people living in the area.

The Russo-British Great Game

The term "frontier region" refers to the entire region that includes Kashmir and extends westward into Afghanistan, and the British had long had a particular interest in this part of the world. Beginning with the conclusion of the wars fought by Napoleon in 1815, the entire purpose of the British government's policy during the nineteenth century, which came to be known as magnificent isolation, was to maintain the country's position of political isolation from continental Europe. The fundamental reason for isolating itself was so that all of its resources could be used towards extending its colonial possessions elsewhere, particularly its Indian empire. During this time period, British foreign policy placed a primary emphasis on protecting the British position in India from any and all potential challenges.

However, because of the dominance of the Royal Navy at sea, there were not many dangers coming from other countries towards British India. The Russian Empire was the most significant of the great powers that was gradually advancing to India's doorstep. It was expanding eastward from Europe, through Siberia and Central Asia, southwards towards India, and farther east through Manchuria towards China. Both India and China, with their enormous populations, were considered as ideal markets for European factories, and Russian advances towards both were seen as a strategic danger to British interests, especially to India, which by the middle of the 19th century was wholly a British colony. British interests were particularly concerned with India because it was an exclusively British territory at this time. The fundamental impetus behind Britain's participation in the Crimean War was the threat that Russia may gain access to the Black Sea, which would then prevent the country from reaching its Indian colony. This was the primary driving element behind the conflict. This geopolitical war between the two European powers would take the shape of the Great

Game, which would take place in Central Asia and for the control and security of India's northern frontiers. This would be the aspect of this conflict that would be the most significant and have the longest-lasting impact.

At this crucial juncture, Sir Halford Mackinder, a very renowned English geographer who was also the Director of the London School of Economics at the time, deserves a significant note for the reasons that will become clear in a moment. The 'Heartland Theory,' which was published in 1904 by the Royal Geographical Society in an article titled 'The Geographical Pivot of History,' has been the subject of geostrategic theory with both its proponents and opponents. This article was published by the Royal Geographical Society. Mackinder advanced the idea that what we now refer to as the 'global continent' was actually the 'Afro-Eurasian' or 'Afro-Eurasia' continent. The term "pivot" refers to the territory that encompasses Eastern Europe, Siberia, and Central Asia. Whoever controlled the "pivot" would control the "world continent," and whoever controlled the "world continent" would rule the world. In spite of the fact that this concept has been subjected to a number of criticisms, it was undeniably a condensed statement of British strategic thought during the majority of the 19th century. Of course, by the time the essay was published, the entire land comprising the 'pivot' belonged to the Russian Empire.

It is important to note that the Russo-Japanese War was already in progress when this article was published in April of 1904. This fact must be brought to the reader's attention. After the final Russian loss at the battle of Tsushima in 1905, British strategic thinking would turn from Russia to imperial Germany as the principal danger, which would ultimately result in the formation of the Anglo-Russian Entente in 1907. This would also push the "Heartland Theory" further to the periphery, and a greater emphasis would be placed on competing with Germany in the marine sphere.

However, during the most of the 19th century, British and Russian explorers and geographers continued to push the boundaries of diplomacy and geographic knowledge in the most inaccessible parts of the Hindukush, Pamirs, and Himalayas. According to British army Colonel John Biddulph, who served as the British Political Officer in Gilgit while he was stationed there, the name of the territory that is now known as Gilgit was formerly known as Sargin. However, at a later date, this name was altered to Gilit, and at a later date, when the Sikh and Dogra dominated it, the name was altered even further to Gilgit; however, this is disapproved of by A.H. According to Dani, the name of the region has never been anything other than Gilgit.³⁶ It was this massive struggle for dominance over Central Asia and the control over the routes to India that would come to be known as the "Great Game." This conflict would end up determining British policy in Gilgit-Baltistan and would

go on to define the region. As early as 1846, it appears that one of the motivations for having Gulab Singh in power in the region was the objective of having a friendly state in power in the northern reaches of India's geographical boundaries. This intention seems to have been the driving force behind having Gulab Singh in power. After obtaining permission from the British government, Maharaja Gulab Singh led a punitive expedition against Gauhar Rahman in the year 1851. This expedition targeted Gauhar Rahman.

*"Permission was granted by the British Government in 1851 for a successful raid, and two columns entered Chilas, - one from Cashmere by the Lolab Valley, and one from Astor by the Mazenoo Pass."*³⁷

This is unequivocal evidence that the British had the intention of expanding their sphere of control over the northern mountains. However, a number of British explorers, like as Wilhelm Leitner, were of the opinion that the region of Gilgit-Baltistan ought to be left unaffiliated, functioning instead as a "no man's land" or buffer zone between the spheres of influence of the British and the Russians. Leitner makes the following observations in his accounts:

*"The neutralization of the Pamirs is the only solution of a difficulty created by the conjectural treaties of diplomatists and the ambition of military emissaries. Left as a huge happy hunting-ground for sportsmen, or as pasturage for nomads from whatever quarter, the Pamirs form the most perfect "neutral zone" conceivable. That the wanderings of these nomads should be accompanied by territorial or political claims, whether by Russia, China, Afghanistan, Kashmir, or ourselves, is the height of absurdity."*³⁸

However, by the time that Leitner wrote this, Colonel Biddulph had already been established as the British resident at Gilgit. This demonstrates that the British wished to extend their position as the preeminent authority throughout the region. At a time when the British intended to project influence into the region but had not yet solidified their position in the Punjab and along the north-western frontier, the reign of Gulab Singh had served the British well. This was the case at a time when Gulab Singh was in control. As a result, there was no point in discussing the nature of the political relationship that these minor mountain kingdoms had with the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Since the 1830s, every choice made by the British government regarding its geostrategic policy may be justified by the requirement of the British government to maintain control over the borders of India. All of the major conflicts that brought the British into contact with India's northern and western frontiers, such as the first Anglo-Afghan War and the Anglo-Sikh Wars, can be explained by the British government's concerns regarding Russian plans in the region, as

well as the government's own interests in Central Asia, which was increasingly becoming more dominated by the Russians. This includes the conflict that led to the British coming into contact with India's northern and western frontiers.

Clearly, Kashmir under the Dogras was a major British asset in the region after the second Anglo-Sikh War, and the British support gave the Dogras an opportunity to extend their own rule over these minor nations in the region. This occurred after the second Anglo-Sikh War. Both the British and the Dogras benefited from this arrangement: the Dogras were able to extend their sphere of influence into areas that had previously been out of their reach, and the British were able to safeguard the frontiers of their Indian territories with the help of the Dogras. This policy would eventually put the British into a situation where they would have to contend with these mountainous kingdoms, which had traditionally been independent due to the geographical isolation of their locations, as pointed out by John Keay in his book titled "The Gilgit Game - Explorers of the Western Himalayas 1865-95." Keay makes this point in his book titled "The Gilgit Game."

"Having committed itself to the idea of appropriating and defending such a remote frontier as the Hindu Kush, the Indian government was faced with the problem of how to control the tribes that lay within it. Their diversity proved as much a stumbling block as their ferocity. The study of the tribes, fascinating enough in itself, was expected to provide pointers as to how their loyalty could most readily be secured. It did up to a point; but such recommendations were usually ignored in favour of some supposed essential of imperial strategy. And as a result, just as the Great Game often seemed to have something to do with skirmishes with the Pathans on the northwest frontier, so the Gilgit Game had a way of deteriorating from the lofty ideals of Anglo-Russian rivalry into frantic and embarrassing fracas with the mountain peoples. On what became known as India's northern, as opposed to north-western frontier, actual hostilities lasted for only four years and were never as bloody as those round the Khyber."39

Conclusion

It is apparent that the narratives of explorers and adventurers such as Leitner and Drew contributed to train the British policymakers to comprehend the levers that could be used to influence and eventually govern these tough and inaccessible places. This is evidenced by the fact that the British policymakers were able to understand these levers. During this time, Russian expansion into Central Asia was picking up steam and becoming increasingly aggressive. After suffering a temporary setback in the Crimean War in 1853,

the Russians soon retook Tashkent, Bukhara, and Samarkand in 1868. In the year 1873, the Russians established a protectorate over the Khanate of Khiva, which is located in what is now the country of Uzbekistan. This brought them right up to the border of British India. This appeared to the British as vindication of their long-standing fears that the growth of Russian military power would eventually culminate in a threat to their Indian possessions. The British viewed this as a threat to their Indian possessions.

This, of course, set off alarm bells for British officials, who at this point intended to establish Afghanistan as a "neutral zone" between the "Asiatic Empires of Russia and Britain."⁴⁰ The appearance of the Russians at India's doorstep in 1876 resulted in the British deciding to send Colonel John Biddulph on a covert mission to Gilgit, which ultimately led to his establishment at Gilgit in 1877 as an officer on special duty. This was the direct consequence of the fact that the Russians were at India's doorstep. This was done naturally to offer an official British political representation in the strategically crucial territory to thwart any prospective efforts made by the Russian government, despite the fact that such moves were highly unlikely.

In point of fact, the British overtures to the native chiefdoms in the territory of Gilgit-Baltistan need to be understood in the context of the second Anglo-Afghan War of 1878. Numerous British primary documents, reports, and letters from the second half of the 19th century attest to this fact. In point of fact, all British reports from the Gilgit-Baltistan region as well as Chitral are filed under the 'Frontier' category in the British indices of the time. Maintaining and eventually expanding their hold on the greater frontier region that went from Ladakh in the east to the Durand Line along Afghanistan in the west was something that the British were going to continue to do.

In 1889, the role of the British political officer in Gilgit would be elevated to that of a full-fledged British resident. Colonel Algernon Durand would be the first person to hold this position, which exemplified the formation of a more formal relationship between the British and the frontier region. The following is how Colonel Durand expressed the British government's concern on a potential danger from Russia:

"No man in his senses ever believed that a Russian army would cross the Pamirs and attack India by the passes of Hunza and Chitral, but we could not overlook the fact that in 1885, when war hung in the balance, some thousands of her troops were moved down towards the Pamirs. What was this for? hardly for change of air or to shoot big game, as the British public were asked to believe later, when similar moves were made. The object was to get a footing on the south side of the Hindu-Kush, and to paralyse numbers

*of our troops who would have to be kept in observation of possible Russian lines of advance."*⁴¹

In point of fact, it would be the British fears over a hypothetical Russian incursion into India from the North-western frontier that would establish the political boundaries of the Indian subcontinent, which would have disastrous ramifications for the destiny of the region after the departure of the British.

(Maps and documents in the paper are provided by the author may not agree with the official position as it is an academic exposition)

End Notes:

1. Toynbee, Arnold, *The New Europe: Some Essays in Reconstruction*, J.M.Dent& Sons Limited, New York, 1916, pp 39.
2. Prescott, J.R.V, *The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries*, Routledge, New York 2015, pp 33.
3. Map from "The Making of a Frontier: five years' experiences and adventures in Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, Chitral, and the Eastern Hindu-Kush" by Colonel Algernon Durand, Picryl.com, accessed on August 30, 2022, <https://picryl.com/media/map-from-the-making-of-a-frontier-five-years-experiences-and-adventures-in-d283a4>
4. Bryant, E, Bryant, E and Patton, L, *The Indo-Aryan Controversy Evidence and Inference in Indian History*, 2005, Routledge, 2005, pp 270.
5. Map from "Dardistan in 1866, 1886 and 1893" by G.W. Leitner, Gutenberg.org, accessed on August 31, 2022, <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/60590/60590-h/images/illus1.jpg>
6. Biddulph, J, *Tribes of the Hindukush*, Superintendent of Government Printing Press, Calcutta, 1880, p 21.
7. Ibid, p 25.
8. Ibid, 1880, p 28.
9. Ibid.
10. Leitner, G.W., *Dardistan in 1866, 1886 and 1893*, Asian Educational Services, New Delhi, 1996, p 16.
11. Ibid.
12. Biddulph, J, *Tribes of the Hindukush*, Superintendent of Government Printing Press, Calcutta, 1880, p 30.

13. Biddulph, J, Tribes of the Hindukush, Superintendent of Government Printing Press, Calcutta, 1880, p 30,
14. Ibid, pp 17-18.
15. Dani, A.H, History of the Northern Areas of Pakistan, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad, 1991, p 244.
16. Ibid, p 245.
17. Gupte, P, India the Challenge of Change, Methuen/Mandarin, 1989, p 170.
18. Stellrecht, Irmtraud, Perspectives on History and Change in the Karakorum, Hindukush, and Himalaya, Rüdiger Köppe, 1997, p 219.
19. Dani, A.H, History of the Northern Areas of Pakistan, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad, 1991, p 247.
20. Sahagala, N, A State in Turbulence Jammu & Kashmir, Ocean Books, 2013, p 57.
21. Dani, A.H, History of the Northern Areas of Pakistan, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad, 1991, p 249.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Drew, Fredrick, The northern barrier of India. A popular account of the Jummoo and Kashmir territories, Edward Stanford, London, 1877, pp 184.
25. Dani, A.H, History of the Northern Areas of Pakistan, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad, 1991, pp 253.
26. Dani, A.H, History of the Northern Areas of Pakistan, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad, 1991, p 252.
27. Kendall, E and Stein, E (Ed), Twenty-First Century Jihad Law Society and Military Action, I.B.Tauris, London, 2015, p 20.
28. Map 4, Northern Areas (Pakistan) reference map for Gilgit District showing Yasin, Hunza, and Nagar valleys, Brill and The Hague Academy of International Law, accessed on August 30, 2022, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gilgit-Baltistan_map_with_tehsils_labelled.png
29. Drew, Fredrick, The northern barrier of India. A popular account of the Jummoo and Kashmir territories, Edward Stanford, London, 1877, pp 185.
30. Drew, F, The Jummoo and Kashmir Territories, Edward Stanford, London, 1875, p 441.

31. Drew, Fredrick, *The northern barrier of India. A popular account of the Jummoo and Kashmir territories*, Edward Stanford, London, 1877, p 186.
32. Ibid.
33. Drew, F, *The Jummoo and Kashmir Territories*, Edward Stanford, London, 1875, p 442.
34. Snedden, C, *Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris*, Hurst, London, 2015, p 80.
35. Drew, F, *The Jummoo and Kashmir Territories*, Edward Stanford, London, 1875, pp 444.
36. Dani, A.H, *History of the Northern Areas of Pakistan*, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad, 1991, pp 162.
37. Biddulph, J, *Tribes of the Hindukush*, Superintendent of Government Printing Press, Calcutta, 1880, p 31.
38. Leitner, G.W., *Dardistan in 1866, 1886 and 1893*, Asian Educational Services, New Delhi, 1996, appendix, p 20.
39. Keay, John, *The Gilgit Game - The Explorers of the Western Himalayas 1865-95*, Butler and Tanner Ltd, Frome and London, 1979, pp 6-7.
40. Vambery, A, *England and Russian in Asia, The Nineteenth Century*, George Munro, New York, June 1880, p 2.
41. Durand, A, *The Making of a Frontier*, John Murray, London, 1900, p 42.

References:

Primary Sources

1. Biddulph, J, *Tribes of the Hindukush*, Superintendent of Government Printing Press, Calcutta, 1880.
2. Drew, F, *The northern barrier of India. A popular account of the Jummoo and Kashmir territories*, Edward Stanford, London, 1877.
3. Durand, A, *The Making of a Frontier*, John Murray, London, 1900.
4. Leitner, G.W., *Dardistan in 1866, 1886 and 1893*, Asian Educational Services, New Delhi, 1996.
5. Vambery, A, *England and Russian in Asia, The Nineteenth Century*, George Munro, New York, June 1880.

Books

1. Bryant, E, Bryant, E and Patton, L, *The Indo-Aryan Controversy Evidence and Inference*

- in Indian History, 2005, Routledge, 2005.
2. Dani, A.H, History of the Northern Areas of Pakistan, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad, 1991.
 3. Gupte, P, India the Challenge of Change, Methuen/Mandarin, 1989.
 4. Keay, John, The Gilgit Game - The Explorers of the Western Himalayas 1865-95, Butler and Tanner Ltd, Frome and London, 1979.
 5. Prescott, J.R.V, The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries, Routledge, New York 2015.
 6. Sahagala, N, A State in Turbulence Jammu & Kashmir, Ocean Books, 2013.
 7. Stellrecht, Irmtraud, Perspectives on History and Change in the Karakorum, Hindukush, and Himalaya, RüdigerKöppe, 1997.
 8. Toynbee, Arnold, The New Europe: Some Essays in Reconstruction, J.M.Dent & Sons Limited, New York, 1916.

Websites

1. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gilgit-Baltistan_map_with_tehsils_labelled.png
2. <https://picryl.com/media/map-from-the-making-of-a-frontier-five-years-experiences-and-adventures-in-d283a4>
3. Map from "The Making of a Frontier: five years' experiences and adventures in Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, Chitral, and the Eastern Hindu-Kush" by Colonel Algernon Durand, Picryl.com.
4. Northern Areas (Pakistan) reference map for Gilgit District showing Yasin, Hunza, and Nagar valleys, Brill and The Hague Academy of International Law.