Abstract
The recent escalation of the Iran-Israel conflict has profoundly restructured the security architecture of the Gulf. It has exposed the vulnerability of the Gulf cooperation council (GCC) countries to direct security threats and spillover in the region. The Iranian missile and drone attacks affected Gulf states as well as U.S. military facilities in the region. It has also disrupted the maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz, thus highlighting the limitations of relying on a single security guarantor externally and also intensified the debates regarding the future of security architecture of the Gulf. While the U.S. has responded militarily to the actions of the Iran, the conflict has nevertheless enhanced the concerns of the GCC about the predictability, adequacy, and sustainability of the present security arrangements, instigating more focus on strategic diversification and regional resilience. In this context, this article studies the evolution of Türkiye from being a strategic partner to an evolving stakeholder of the Gulf security. This article maintains that Türkiye’s enhancing defence diplomacy, military cooperation, intelligence partnership, and political engagement position it as an increasingly critical to the security of the region rather than merely an economic partner. The normalization of relations post Al-Ula summit, with UAE and Saudi Arabia, coupled with Türkiye’s longstanding relationship with Qatar, has enhanced the capacity of Türkiye to involve with the Gulf on the wider security issues. The instability in the region and the changing perceptions of the threat in the region, intensified by the Iran-Israel conflict, create structural pressures on the Gulf countries. Although it is highly unlikely that Türkiye will replace U.S. as the principal external security provider of the Gulf, it is increasingly evolving as a complementary stakeholder of the security of the region.
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